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Abstract—Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) is
one of the driving applications of vehicular ad-hoc networks
(VANETs) and promises to bring more efficient and faster
transportation through cooperative behavior between vehicles.
In CACC, vehicles exchange information, which is relied on to
partially automate driving; however, this reliance on cooperation
requires resilience against attacks and other forms of misbe-
havior. In this paper, we propose a rigorous attacker model
and an evaluation framework for this resilience by quantifying
the attack impact, providing the necessary tools to compare
controller resilience and attack effectiveness simultaneously. Al-
though there are significant differences between the resilience of
the three analyzed controllers, we show that each can be attacked
effectively and easily through either jamming or data injection.
Our results suggest a combination of misbehavior detection
and resilient control algorithms with graceful degradation are
necessary ingredients for secure and safe platoons.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we study cooperative adaptive cruise con-
trol (CACC), an application of Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks
(VANETs) aimed at increasing road efficiency by partially
automating driving. CACC is essentially an extension of
existing cruise control (CC) and adaptive cruise control (ACC)
technologies, both of which are designed to allow the driver
to maintain constant speed while driving. In the case of ACC,
vehicular sensors, such as RADAR, LIDAR and cameras,
are used to measure the distance to the preceding vehicle,
in order to automatically respond to changes in its’ driving
behavior. CACC extends this concept by allowing vehicles
to communicate and create a platoon, consisting of a leader
vehicle and multiple followers, as shown in Figure 1. There
are many different controller implementations in the literature
that enable this behavior [1] since the proposal of CACC
proposal in the 90s. It has been shown that CACC can be
more efficient than ACC, and that even a constant spacing
between vehicles (i.e., independent of platoon speed) can be
theoretically achieved, whereas it has been shown that ACC
alone cannot achieve this goal [2].
Since CACC was proposed, VANETs have made significant
leaps in development, including the DSRC standard and a
variety of ETSI, IEEE and SAE standards that define the
various network layers. In parallel to these developments,
security standards were designed, in order to protect against
attacks common in other fields. In relatively early research,
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Fig. 1. This figure shows a platoon with a leader and several followers: in
our work, the red vehicle is the attacker, and the platoon length is 8. The
attacker transmits a malicious beacon with a false acceleration of −30m/s2.
it became clear that integrity is the most significant security
goal for VANETs in general [3], although availability is also
significant. The IEEE 1609.2 standard defines how to protect
against common external attacks, by providing message in-
tegrity and message authenticity (i.e., only legitimate vehicles
can transmit messages). Both the C2C-CC in Europe and the
CAMP in the US have since started deployment of security
credential management systems (SCMSs) to manage what
constitutes legitimate vehicles. In parallel, one of the major
advances in the security community was the introduction of
misbehavior detection, as a mean to detect and revoke vehicles
that transmit malicious data. This type of behavior is at the
focus of this work, particularly because the desired increased
road usage with CACC requires vehicles to move in a way
that would be unstable if only ACC was deployed.
The research in misbehavior detection for VANETs con-
centrates mostly on being able to detect incorrect informa-
tion in beacon messages. These messages, defined by the
previously mentioned standards, are periodically sent to all
neighboring vehicles to inform them of the state of the sender.
One of the main application areas studied to evaluate such
detection schemes is position-based routing, where multi-hop
communication is enabled by finding routes based on vehicle
positions. Because vehicle position is also used in order to
avoid potential accidents in normal traffic (e.g., by warning
the driver with an alarm tone), many detection algorithms
operate on position information specifically. However, CACC
typically uses acceleration and speed information to compute
the behavior of the local vehicle based on that of the leader and
predecessor vehicles (and in some cases, the entire platoon). If
this information becomes unavailable or is incorrect, accidents
may occur. The data for CACC controllers is essential to
protect, but the security of these controllers when considering©2017 IEEE accepted for VNC 2017 (no DOI available yet)
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malicious insiders has only been studied by few authors [4],
[5], [6], [7].
Existing work shows, that attacks can impact safety (i.e.,
potentially cause accidents), but lack a rigorous analysis and
a framework within which such attacks and the resilience of
the respective controllers can be analyzed. In this paper, we lay
the groundwork for such a framework: we implement several
attacks and provide a concrete quantification to measure the
impact of an attack. Going beyond simply finding whether an
accident occurs or not, we analyze the significance of such
an attack (in terms of the ∆v of the accident) and quantify
how the stability of an individual platoon is affected even
if no accident occurs. We present results for three existing
controllers implemented in Plexe [8]. Because we use this ex-
tensible platooning simulator as a basis for our evaluation, our
work can easily be extended with new controllers. Similarly,
our attack implementation can easily be extended to study
the impact of more attacks. We publish the source code, data
analysis scripts, and recorded data in order to stimulate further
research in this area.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II discusses the existing analyses of attacks on CACC and
platooning, as well as some basics regarding the controllers
in Plexe. In Section III we divide existing attacks into three
categories, of which two are analyzed extensively in this paper.
We also discuss which proposed attacks are infeasible under
the assumption that current security standards are implemented
correctly. Section IV describes our simulation setup and the
corresponding evaluation methodology.We discuss these re-
sults and their implications for CACC in Section V, and close
with a conclusion in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
We distinguish two areas of related work: controllers, which
implement the functionality that CACC and ACC offer, and
existing studies on misbehavior in platooning and similar
settings.
A. Controllers
Platoons are vehicles driving in a group, attempting to keep
a minimal but still safe distance between the vehicles within
the group. This can be achieved using ACC and CACC; the
main reason for using CACC is that the safe distance can be
much smaller. In both settings, a platoon normally consists of
a single leader and a set of followers, together referred to as
the platoon (or sometimes, string). The set of followers can be
dynamic, although this usually requires some kind of join and
leave procedures. Each vehicle implements a controller that
determines the desired acceleration, which is used to configure
the vehicles’ engine and brake controller. In this work we focus
on the upper controller (i.e., setting the desired acceleration)
exclusively, since this is the controller that an attacker can
easily reach (either through communication or through attacks
on sensors).
There is a broad scope of literature from the control
theory and engineering side covering a variety of different
controllers [1]. This literature typically introduces two stability
metrics: local stability and string stability. Here, local stability
refers to a vehicles’ distance to the next vehicle, while string
stability is a property of the platoon that determines how
spacing errors propagate through the platoon. A platoon is
considered string stable when the∞-norm of the transfer func-
tion is less than 1 (||Hˆ(s)||∞ ≤ 1) [2], which basically means
that the platoon will eventually converge to a stable state
if the leader keeps a specific velocity perfectly. Maintaining
the distance to the next vehicle can done by keeping a fixed
distance (i.e., meters) or by maintaining a speed-dependent
headway time (i.e., seconds), referred to as constant spacing
and constant-time spacing. Earlier work has shown that non-
cooperative methods (i.e., ACC) cannot achieve string stability
in a constant spacing policy [2].
In this work we focus on controllers implemented by
Segata et al. [8] in Plexe, which includes a constant spac-
ing controller, a controller with graceful degradation and a
consensus controller. The constant spacing controller is taken
from Rajamani [2] and keeps a fixed distance based on the
measured distance and the received speed and acceleration of
the preceding vehicle and the leader vehicle. The controller by
Ploeg et al. [9] is designed to enable graceful degradation on
network errors: their degraded CACC controller predicts the
acceleration of the preceding vehicle if this information is not
received. The idea is that this degraded controller outperforms
ACC, and can thus be used to bridge communication gaps;
this is particularly interesting for jamming attacks. The last
controller is a consensus algorithm by di Bernardo et al. [10],
which uses the position, speed, and acceleration information of
all vehicles in the platoon. This controller has a larger spacing,
but aims to maintain stability bidirectionally (i.e., vehicles also
adapt their behavior to that of vehicles behind them); this is
particularly interesting with respect to data injection attacks.
B. Existing Attacks
Attacks on CACC have typically been studied from two
different perspectives, mostly working in parallel. Security
research in vehicular networks has already suggested new
types of attacks for the overall network in the previous
decade [3]. More recent work has concentrated on misbe-
havior detection [11] and data injection attacks, which are
uniquely suitable for vehicular networks and other cyber-
physical systems. Platooning is one of the motivating examples
for these researchers. On the other hand, authors from the
control theory side have gained an understanding of potential
security concerns, and have started developing attack-resilient
control algorithms. In terms of attacks, some authors have
also investigated how to exploit knowledge of the controller
to show that attacks causing instability are possible.
Alipour-Fanid et al. [7] discussed platoon behavior under
jamming. In their attack scenario, the jammer is a drone
flying above the platoon, aiming to use its’ limited power
to disrupt the platoon from above. Jamming is thus done
reactively (i.e., with success rate < 100%) to conserve power,
although power consumption is not considered further. Their
work shows that their ACC controller is string stable at 2.2
seconds headway distance, while CACC under the influence of
their reactive jammer is string stable at 1.7 seconds headway
distance. Additionally, they show the attack works best when
the attacker is located near the first vehicle in the platoon.
Amoozadeh et al. [6] discuss a two-level controller model
and describe a variety of attacks, including application and
network layer attacks, as well as other issues such as sensor
tampering and privacy issues. They present a result of a
message falsification attack, which in their setting is a vehicle
external to the platoon that falsifies all beacons; the result
of the attack is platoon instability (i.e., the platoon does not
converge back to a stable state). They also explain that such
an attack is most effective when acceleration changes occur.
Similar results are presented for a jamming attack – here, the
authors’ controller downgrades to ACC automatically. In our
work, we aim to show that such a downgrade is not necessarily
sufficient, depending on how system parameters are chosen.
DeBruhl et al. [5] also use a two component controller,
consisting of a PD feedback controller (radar-based) to keep
distance and a feedforward controller (communication-based),
whose outputs are added together to form the desired ac-
celeration that is provided to the vehicle drivetrain. This
controller has been shown to be string-stable in real networked
platoons, and DeBruhl et al. examine its’ behavior under
various attack strategies, including a collision induction attack.
The authors continue to develop an error calculation and
detection algorithm, which essentially estimates the expected
behavior of the vehicle in front and switches to ACC if this
vehicle appears to behave differently than it claims to.
Outside of the context of communication, but also rele-
vant to secure and safe platooning, is the work from the
research group of Gerdes et al. [12] and Dadras et al. [4].
These authors looked at ACC-based platoons, and examined
adversarial behavior within such a platoon, where the attacker
systematically disrupts the distributed control algorithm using
another algorithm that manipulates control input of their own
vehicle to achieve their goal. In the first work, the authors show
that for a given PID controller, they can cause significantly
increased energy consumption in neighboring vehicles; as
reduced energy consumption is one of the main drivers of
CACC research, this impact is significant. The second work
shows that for a PD controller, the attacker can cause the
platoon to be asymptotically unstable, i.e., destabilize and
eventually dissolve the platoon.
III. ATTACKER MODEL
In this section, we describe our attacker model, which covers
attacks proposed in the literature above, as well as elements
from the area of misbehavior detection [11] and attacks on
sensors [13]. In particular, we are interested in how realistic
the attacks proposed in the literature are, when considering
currently standardized security mechanisms. Standardized se-
curity mechanisms include the use of pseudonymous certifi-
cates to protect driver privacy, the corresponding private keys
of which are stored in a hardware security module (HSM),
which is somewhat protected against tampering. The core of
our attacker model is that an attacker may gain control over a
vehicle, and thus over legitimate key material. This can happen
either through software compromise (e.g., malware spread
through applications running on the entertainment system), by
physical manipulation of the vehicle, or through key extrac-
tion from an old HSM. However, unlike traditional network
attacker models, the attacker additionally must obey the laws
of physics that are observable by any network participant (e.g.,
an attacker is not omnipresent throughout the network).
For CACC specifically, we assume the software and protocol
implementations are suitable, i.e., the attacker cannot find an
exploit here, and must obey the protocol. In other words, we
restrict the target of the attack to the platooning application,
and assume other mechanisms are in place to filter out invalid
or improperly formatted messages. In our model, the attackers’
primary goal is to cause a crash within the platoon, with the
secondary goal of destabilizing it. We assume the attacker is
already part of the platoon, a position from which the attacks
can do the most damage. However, as the literature points
out [5], if the attacker controls the leader vehicle, they have
complete control over the platoon, and therefore attacks should
be performed by a non-leader vehicle. We follow this argument
and also assume attacks are executed by a follower in order
to study the potential impact of attacks. Another argument
for this is that leader vehicles can be placed under additional
scrutiny and replaced if necessary, while followers are more
difficult to replace if they are non-cooperative.
A. Jamming
Denial of service (DoS) attacks includes a variety of jam-
ming attacks (regular and reactive), which are the most popular
variant of this attack within vehicular networks. This also in-
cludes various attacks on higher layers that influence reception
(e.g., violating the MAC protocol, causing others to wait).
Some authors [6] also suggest a DoS attack may be launched
on the network layer, in order to disrupt communication by
overloading the hardware security module (HSM). This leads
to a form of cryptographic packet loss, i.e., packet loss caused
because messages cannot be verified, or cannot be verified in
time [14]. In this work, we consider all of these attacks to have
the same effect, i.e., that messages will no longer arrive, and
we refer to it as jamming. This generalizes the attack compared
to the related work [7], where the authors considered reactive
jamming.
B. V2X Data Injection
The second class of attacks we identify is V2X Data Injec-
tion, which generalizes a variety of different attacks discussed
in related work [6], [5]. Any attack that requires the attacker
(or a vehicle compromised by the attacker) to send modified
packets falls into this category; it is particularly useful because
these types of attacks may be feasible to mitigate through
misbehavior detection. The specific implementation of this
attack is usually dependent on the type of data exchanged by
the controller, and thus the corresponding impact is different
for every controller. Similarly, the goal of an attacker is
significant for the implementation, and sometimes used as
a distinguishing factor in the literature (this includes the
reduced headway attack, the collision induction attack and the
misreporting attack, among others). However, these goals can
often be achieved through one of the other classes of attacks
(e.g., collision induction is possible through jamming), and
thus we avoid this terminology.
Spoofing and replay attacks can also be considered exam-
ples of this class, but these are considered mostly solved in
the vehicular networking security community. In vehicular
networks, where GPS is often assumed to be practically
ubiquitous, replay attacks can be protected against using (close
to) synchronized clocks. Similarly, because cryptographic keys
are authenticated through pseudonymous certificates, and mes-
sages are protected by digital signatures, spoofing attacks that
cause the receiver to misinterpret the origin of the message are
not possible. This also applies to message falsification attacks
(i.e., attacks that manipulate messages of other vehicles),
for which digital signatures are an adequate countermeasure.
However, it is possible to use multiple certificates to simulate
more than one vehicle – this is referred to as a Sybil attack (as
originally introduced by Douceur [15]). Whether this attack is
feasible depends on how easy it is for the attacker to obtain
pseudonymous certificates that can be used simultaneously.
C. Sensor Manipulation
The third and final class of attacks is sensor manipulation,
which constitutes any attack that causes the internal network
of the vehicle to report incorrect information to the controller.
An attacker could either have access to the internal network of
the vehicle and transmit false data here, causing the vehicle
to react incorrectly (or even destabilize the platoon through
the controller attack [4]). Although this could also be done
in software, i.e., manipulating memory before the controller
processes the inputs, attacks on the internal network are con-
sidered to be more interesting, because misbehavior detection
is a potential countermeasure. Software attacks, on the other
hand, are difficult to prevent through misbehavior detection, as
the detection system will likely also be compromised in such
a setting.
Another variant of sensor manipulation positions the at-
tacker outside of the target vehicle: instead of attacking the
network, the attacker uses their sensors and other tools to blind
the sensors of the target vehicle, or cause them to behave in
a certain way. Researchers have shown that both LIDAR and
cameras are vulnerable to such attacks [13], and the effect
of such an attack is very similar to the other type of sensor
manipulation attack (i.e., the controller sees invalid inputs).
The only distinction is where the attacker is located, which
influences the cost of such an attack, but the expected results
for the platoon behavior are similar, and thus for the study of
attacks we place these attacks in the same category.
TABLE I
EXCERPT OF SIMULATION PARAMETERS: FULL PARAMETERS AVAILABLE
IN THE DATA AND SOURCE CODE REPOSITORIES.
transmit power 100mW
sensitivity -94dBm
platoon length 8
attacker ID 3
controllers CACC, Ploeg, Consensus
CACC spacing 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 20 m
target speed 50, 80, 100, 120, 150 km/h
attack: speed value -50, 0, 50, 100, 150 m/s
attack: accel value -30, -10, 0, 10, 30 m/s2
attack: position shift 3, 5, 7, 9, 11 m/s
IV. ATTACK ANALYSIS
In this paper we focus on communication only: we want to
answer the question how CACC behaves under misbehavior,
i.e., what are the potential impacts of such attacks. The aim of
this work is to provide a general framework for attack analysis,
which is helpful for the development of resilient control
algorithms, as well as the misbehavior detection community.
A. Simulation Setup
We use Plexe (version 2.0) [8], which is a simulation
toolkit based on VEINS, as basis for our analysis due to its’
flexibility in implementing control algorithms and accurate
simulation of network behavior. Plexe also extends SUMO,
which provides realistic microsimulations of physical vehicles;
it extends this toolkit with various controllers: a constant
spacing controller [2], a loss-tolerant controller [9] and a
consensus controller [10]. For our implementation, we leave
Plexe mostly unchanged, and only extend it to include our
attacks. We implement four attacks: one jamming attack and
three data injection attacks.
Our jamming attack is designed to analyze the maximum
possible impact of an attack, and is therefore implemented
by locally dropping received messages after the attack starts.
This simulates any type of denial of service, including cryp-
tographic packet loss and various jamming strategies, and
provides an upper bound on the attack success, although it
may overestimate it in some cases. The alternative would
be to implement a specific attack (e.g., as done by Alipour-
Fanid et al. [7]), but this approach is not as generalizable as
ours.
Our data injection attacks are all implemented by exchang-
ing some data with false data in the message an attacker
would send according to the normal control algorithm. We
analyze three different types: injecting false positions, false
speeds or false acceleration values. There are multiple ways
to implement these attacks; in our case, we set the attackers’
value to a constant value for speed and acceleration, which
greatly simplifies the interpretation of the results. In addition,
we again aim to provide an upper bound on the attack
effectiveness. For position falsification, we provide a position
error that increases linearly over time, and is added to the
vehicles’ current position for each beacon.
The simulation scenario we analyze is a standard scenario
from Plexe, which was used by the authors to analyze platoon
behavior: the sinusoidal scenario. This scenario initializes
the platoon and then provides the leader with a specific
acceleration profile that leads to a sinusoidal speed graph.
By performing attacks at different points in time, we can use
this scenario to approximate the impact of attacks on real
behavior. The significant simulation parameters can be found
in I; the complete configuration file and code is available on
Github1. Because of the way Plexe is implemented, simulating
chain collisions reliably was not possible, so we collected
information about the first collision only.
B. Metrics
In this work, we aim to analyze the effectiveness of various
attacks on different CACC controllers. The goal of our attacker
is to either cause a crash or maximize instability of the platoon.
As such, we distinguish between two cases: a crash or some
instability. If a crash occurs, impact velocity ∆v is used to
quantify the impact of the attack (medical research suggests
that this is the best predictive factor for injury [16]). If there
is no crash, we quantify the instability in the platoon for
the remainder of the simulation (approximately 30 seconds).
Since all the studied controllers have been shown to be string
stable, we can assume that the platoon eventually stabilizes.
The option we chose is maxs,i,t(e), where s is the simulation
run, i is the ith vehicle in the platoon, t is time and e
is spacing error, which most accurately represent the worst
case. This was inspired by earlier work [7], where a similar
metric is used. The spacing error is defined as the difference
between the desired distance of the controller and the actual
distance between two vehicles. The alternative metrics were
avgs(avgi(maxt(e))), the average maximum spacing error,
and avgs(avgi(maxt(a))), the average maximum accelera-
tion, both of which can be considered metrics for passenger
comfort. Usability studies have shown [17] that spacing is
important for user acceptance; we included the acceleration as
an additional metric, which is also common in transportation
research. Averaging over simulations and vehicles allow us to
estimate the average comfort of all vehicles in a platoon; how-
ever, the maximum spacing error more accurately represents
the potential inefficiency and risk due to an attack, which is
why we decided on this metric2.
C. Results
This section presents the results of our attack experiments,
and shows how we used our metrics to gain insight into the
effectiveness of different attacks, as well as the resilience of
the existing CACC algorithms. The data on which these results
are based will also be published on Github3, although they can
also be re-generated using the source code and configuration
mentioned above.
1https://github.com/vs-uulm/vnc2017-CACC-code
2The data repository for this paper includes all metrics.
3https://github.com/vs-uulm/vnc2017-CACC-data
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1) Jamming: We first discuss the results of our jamming
attack, which are shown in Figure 2. This figure includes
both successful attacks (i.e., crashes, marked in red) and
stability impact (i.e., no crash, marked in blue), as well as the
corresponding impact (see Section IV-B). The figure shows
aggregated values (using the previously discussed aggregation
approach) over five runs. In all cases, the impact of the attack
remained similar (i.e. all five runs resulted in collisions or
all five runs did not result in collisions). We simulated this
for different target speeds and different jamming times: the
target speed is the intended average speed of the platoon (i.e.,
the average speed of the leader vehicle), while the jamming
time is the time at which jamming starts. The jamming time
directly corresponds to the range in which acceleration of the
leader vehicle is positive; since the leader data is disseminated
throughout the platoon, the attacker can use this acceleration
profile to choose the time of attack. Based on the speed profile
generated from Plexe’s standard configuration, we determined
that the positive acceleration lies between 30 and 32.5 seconds
of simulation time (since the behavior is sinusoidal, this pattern
repeats every 5 seconds).
As can be seen in the figure, the target speed has no impact
on the effectiveness of the attack on CACC. However, the
attacks are more successful with higher velocities when Ploeg
or Consensus are used as the spacing of these algorithms de-
pends on the platoon target speed. We can therefore conclude,
that spacing has a strong influence on attack effectiveness. On
the other hand, attack effectiveness is not directly influenced
by the target velocity. In general, with more spacing, attack
impact decreases. The figure shows that this is not always true
(e.g. CACC-13 vs. CACC-20 at 32s simulation time). This is
due to the fact that with CACC-13 and lower, the attack occurs
between the attacker (car 3) and the subsequent car 4. With
CACC-20, car 4 can avoid colliding with the attacker, however,
car 5 does collide with car 4.
2) Position Injection: The next step in our analysis cov-
ers position falsification attacks, often cited as one of the
most significant types of data injection attacks on vehicular
networks. In our model, the false position is a shift of the
attackers’ real position that increases over time. It turns out
that this attack is completely ineffective against the Ploeg and
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constant spacing controllers – it only causes crashes when the
consensus controller is used. However, we can furthermore
see that the spacing error of the Ploeg controller increases
significantly with the leader target speed. This is because the
consensus controller is the only one that uses received position
information directly. Somewhat surprisingly, the impact of this
attack on the consensus controller depends only on the value
transmitted by the attacker, and not significantly on the target
speed with which the leader (and thus the platoon) is moving.
The full results are shown in Figure 3: for each shift parameter
(mark and color of the scatter plot), with different leader target
speeds (top, left to right), the graph includes the results for
four different controller configurations (bottom, left to right).
The impact speed of successful attacks (white background)
varies from 2 to 9 m/s, while the maximum spacing error
(gray background) is unaffected by the position falsification.
This means that all attacks that have any effect lead to an
accident.
3) Speed Injection: Our next attack was manipulating the
speed transmitted by the attacker. Here, we continuously out-
put the same value regardless of platoon or controller behavior,
which causes the error between the attacker’s value and actual
value to vary from 10 to −10 km/h if it falsifies the platoon
target speed. The result of our analysis, displayed in Figure 4,
shows that speed injection is successful against constant spac-
ing CACC only, where the most significant crashes happen
at lower speeds; the attacker claims to accelerate, but actually
does not. When the attacker claims negative speeds (e.g., −50)
the result is a high position error. The Ploeg controller shows
the same behavior as before (i.e., it is not affected by the
attack), and here the consensus controller is also unaffected,
although the spacing error is much higher. Due to a constant
falsified speed, the attacker does not achieve success in the
constant value matching the leaders’ speed; we expect this
will change if the leader behavior is less predictable.
4) Acceleration Injection: The final attack we performed
is manipulation of the transmitted acceleration. Here, we also
chose a relatively extreme scope, in order to discover the maxi-
mum potential of these attacks (−30,−10, 0, 10, 30 m/s2). The
resulting statistics are shown in Figure 5. As expected, this
attack affects all controllers, because acceleration is used in all
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Fig. 5. Behavior of controllers with falsified acceleration information: blue
areas represent points not related to a crash.
the control algorithms. However, the effect is widely different
per controller: the consensus controller can tolerate these large
errors in acceleration information (although the maximum
spacing error increases slightly), while the others fail almost
completely. This is likely due to the fact that the consensus
controller is the only bi-directionally coupled controller (or
more precisely, each vehicle considers all others in its’ control
algorithm). Similar to the speed injection attack, injecting
false acceleration data causes attack impact dependent on the
injected value; the attack impact is significant for positive
acceleration values. However, here the impact of false negative
acceleration is also significant — however, at some point, the
distance sensor notices that the distance is too large, and it
resets to ACC behavior.
V. DISCUSSION
Our results show that most CACC controllers are unreliable
when subject to effective denial of service attacks, and that
the impact of injection is also significant for any data that
is used in the controller directly. This confirms earlier results
on individual jamming and injection experiments, and shows
that these results also hold when simulation parameters are
changed. Beyond this, our results show that the window of
opportunity for the attacker to jam or transmit false informa-
tion is broad, i.e., the attacker does not need to hit precisely
the correct timing for the attack to work. Our results can
also be used as a guide for the attacker to further hone
the effectiveness of an attack against more resilient control
algorithms.
Overall, we can conclude that the Ploeg controller deals
well with jamming even considering that this controller was
only intended for intermittent, unreliable channels, and not
for complete failure. However, we still managed to cause some
accidents even with this algorithm, suggesting that an eventual
complete fallback to ACC may be advisable. The consensus
controller behaves differently, and only fails with a later start-
ing point when jamming — future work could more thoroughly
investigate the cause of this behavior. Finally, we conclude
that the constant spacing controller is completely unsuitable
for unreliable communication; the window for causing a crash
is at least 2 seconds.
For data injection attacks, the actual value transmitted by
the attacker had an important influence over the attack impact,
but the target speed of the leader did not matter much in
comparison. We expected our attacks to increase in impact as
the overall platoon speed increases, because we expected the
controllers to react more quickly in those scenarios. Although
this is the case for some position errors, the crash impact
remains relatively consistent for the CACC controller. For
the Ploeg controller, the impact is dependent on the speed,
but this dependence is mainly due to the speed-dependent
gap that should occur between vehicles. The one exception
to all these observations is the consensus controller, which is
surprisingly resilient against attacks, showing no impact from
speed and acceleration falsification. However, the impact of
position shift on this controller is significant. Nevertheless,
this suggests that the consensus controller might be a good
starting point for building a resilient controller, despite its’
relative ineffectiveness, illustrated by a higher overall position
error.
Our results are likely to extend to similar scenarios; the
CACC and Ploeg controllers both rely only on the leader
and the preceding vehicle, so any platoon long enough to
contain the crashing vehicle is affected by potential crashes.
It is unclear how well the results transfer for the consensus
controller, since its’ intended behavior is quite different from
the other two controllers, considering all the vehicles in
the platoon for the control of each vehicle. However, the
overall methodology we applied here is not constrained to the
scenario — the tools we provide can easily be used to further
tune the parameters of the controllers for increased safety, or
the attackers’ parameters to improve attack effectiveness.
VI. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have discussed a more holistic attacker
model, implemented several attacks and tested their impact
on existing controllers using our proposed analysis method-
ology. Overall, the results show not only that controllers are
vulnerable to attack, but that there are significant differences
between controllers in terms of how they are affected by
attacks. The research community should critically discuss the
limitations of CACC under the influence of these attacks. Our
future work focuses on improving the attacks and studying
their detection; however, detection alone is likely insufficient,
because of the volume of crashes we encountered. Work
should therefore focus also on prevention, through the design
of resilient controllers on the one hand, and effective detection
and revocation mechanisms on the other.
Future work in false data injection could look at how
other types of controllers behave, or study the effectiveness
of simultaneously falsifying multiple fields in the beacon.
The latter is particularly relevant, because it circumvents
many typical misbehavior detection mechanisms (which could
detect most of the attacks we have described with reasonable
accuracy, in part due to the values we chose). An alternative
route that has not yet been studied very well is the injection
of false data into external sensors. Some research has shown
that camera and LIDAR sensors can be tricked easily in a lab
environment [13]. Once Plexe has been extended to include
some sensor error models, experimenting with these attacks
and combining them with false data injection will likely be
an interesting path. Even though attacks on sensors would
rely on line-of-sight and additional equipment (i.e., it cannot
be done by manipulating a vehicle with malware), we have
also found that some injection attacks cause crashes between
vehicles further behind the attacker.
For the development of future control algorithms, we sug-
gest that authors consider a fallback mechanism similar to
the Ploeg controller. However, we suggest that this eventually
downgrades from degraded CACC to pure ACC, because
the error in the estimated acceleration will increase over
time if a jamming attack is maintained long enough. To
improve reliability, using all available inputs may be a feasible
approach to reduce the impact of attacks (e.g., as partially
demonstrated by the consensus controller), especially because
common controllers typically only use leader and preceding
vehicle information. This may not increase overall security, but
will make it more difficult to successfully fine-tune attacks and
achieve a desired impact. Should the information show incon-
sistencies, a fallback mechanism could again be considered;
here the challenge is ensuring that the entire platoon mutually
decides on performing a fallback, to avoid a heterogeneous
controller environment.
The attacks discussed in this work may be detected with
relative ease using plausibility checks; however, the main
aim of this work was to show how attack impact may be
maximized. Future work may look at the maximum tolerance
of the attacks we designed; however, our currently proposed
metrics are bound to the behavior of the leader. The next
step is then to decide how to use this information, apart from
invalidating the vehicle in the SCMS [18], preventing damage
from ongoing attacks is also a goal. If using a controller
with graceful degradation (similar to Ploeg), the detection
may trigger this functionality: when combined with effective
revocation, this will ensure that temporarily degraded service
is the best possible attack. An interesting side aspect is that
not all detection algorithms are compatible with platooning,
because the corresponding behavior is different: it may thus
be a feasible path to design specialized misbehavior detection
mechanisms for the CACC scenario specifically.
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